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ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A 
RESULT GEUKGEUZIAN WAS DEPRIVED OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Geukgeuzian's Appellant Brief, chronicles trial counsel's deficient performance and 
the clear errors he committed which resulted in prejudice to Geukgeuzian. The prejudice 
to Appellant is primarily attributable to trial counsel's failure to object to the proposed 
instructions or provide instructions that accurately outlined the mens rea requirements of 
the charged offenses. These errors prejudiced Geukgeuzian and deprived him of a fair 
trial. 
a. Trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions was deficient 
because it was devoid of any strategic or tactical purpose. 
The State asserts trial counsel's failure to object to the elements instruction was 
reasonable. To support this contention the State offers two possible reasons for trial 
counsel's neglect: "(1) the instructions tracked the statutory language and (2) the 
instruction can be read to include a mental state." Br. Appellee at 9. The State implicitly 
concedes the obvious; failure to instruct a jury on the requisite mens rea element for the 
offense of witness tampering is error. However, the State argues that the error does not 
mean trial counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional 
assistance because it was a reasonable error, or it is understandable how the error 
occurred. Trial counsel's error was not missing an obscure or overly technical aspect of 
the law. More than ten years prior to Geukgeuzian's trial the Utah Supreme Court 
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announced that failure to instruct on an element of a crime constitutes manifest injustice 
and reversible error as a matter of law. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
However, a more fundamental flaw with the State's argument is that it sidesteps 
the required analysis under the first prong of Strickland. That prong requires a 
determination of whether trial counsel's performance meets the objective standard of 
reasonableness. To meet that minimum level of competence, Utah courts have held that 
there must be "some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). The reasons cited by the State explain 
how an error may have been made, however, they do not articulate a "plausible strategic 
explanation" for counsel's behavior nor do they demonstrate a "conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy" as was contemplated by the court in Tennyson, supra. Id. It is not 
enough that reasonable explanations for counsel's omissions exist; there must be a 
reasonable strategic explanation for trial counsel's failure to object to the elements 
instruction. 
There is no possible strategic or tactical explanation for trial counsel' s omissions 
and failures. In its review of Geukgeuzian's case the Utah Supreme Court concluded, 
"Geukgeuzian's [trial counsel's] failure to include a separate mens rea element in his 
proposed instruction was most likely inadvertent..." State v. Geukgeuzian, 86 P.3d 742, 
745 (Utah 2004)(emphasis added). Tellingly, the State fails to advance a plausible 
strategic or tactical reason for trial counsel's failure to object to the omissions in the 
instructions. Where no possible strategic explanation or tactical reason exists for such a 
decision, Utah courts have held that the first part of the Strickland test has been met. See 
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e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 
381 (Utah 1999). 
b. Trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to Geukgeuzian 
and deprived him of a fair trial. 
In order to escape the prejudice prong of Strictland, the State relies on State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2003), State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984), and State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah App. 1994), for the proposition that a 
failure to instruct the jury on an element of a crime is not always a fatal error. The axiom 
that the State would like to synthesize from the cited cases is "if an element of a crime is 
not disputed at trial by the defendant, the prosecution need not instruct on or prove the 
element." Obviously, that axiom would impermissibly shift the burden to the defendant 
to prove his innocence. 
The cases cited by the State are readily distinguishable from the facts in the instant 
case. In Stevenson, the jury instruction in a rape case did not contain the then statutory 
element that the victim and accused not be married. Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292. 
Because all evidence admitted at trial was that the parties were never married, the Court 
found the omission to be harmless error. Id. While non-marriage was not at issue in 
Stevenson, the mental state of Geukgeuzian was the pivotal issue in the present case. 
Likewise, the Casey and Fontana decisions are inapposite to the present case. In 
both Casey and Fontana, the jury was instructed on the proper mens rea element for the 
charged offense. In addition, the juries were instructed on another mental state which 
was erroneous. In Casey and Fontana, the juries were over instructed; the jury in 
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Geukgeuzian's case received no instruction as to the requisite mental state. Accordingly, 
it is impossible to determine upon what basis the jury was making a determination of 
guilt. The implication that the facts in the instant case are comparable to the facts 
presented in Casey, Fontana and Stevenson is unfounded. 
The proper distillation of Casey, Fontana and Stevenson is that in the rare case 
where the evidence would preclude a reasonable minded jury from concluding the non-
existence of a necessary element, failure to instruct on that element is non-prejudicial. 
The evidence in Geukgeuzian's case clearly places it outside the sphere of Casey, 
Fontana and Stevenson. The evidence introduced at trial would not preclude a reasonable 
minded jury from concluding that Geukgeuzian simply did not know that Lyon had 
overheard him make a threat. 
The State asserts that Geukgeuzian was not prejudiced by the deficient jury 
instructions because his "mental state was never at issue." Br. Appellee at 12. This 
allegation is factually inaccurate. Geukgeuzian's position throughout the trial and this 
appeal acknowledges he asked Airman Lyons to provide a statement (the actus reas) 
while denying that he knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly asked Lyons to provide a 
false statement (the mens red). The issue before the jury was not solely whether the 
statement was false, but also whether Geukgeuzian knew it was false. Both 
propositions fairly raise the issue of Geukgeuzian' s mental state at the time he 
requested Lyon to provide him with a statement. Even if Geukgeuzian' s only 
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argument was that he believed the statement Lyon provided him was truthful, 
Geukgeuzian' s mental state was directly at issue. 
The evidence and argument introduced at trial illustrates that trial counsel 
attempted to establish that Geukgeuzian believed Lyon' s statement to be true while 
also arguing that Geukgeuzian didn' t know that Lyon believed his statement to be 
false. Therefore, trial counsel argued, albeit inartfully, that Geukgeuzian did not intend 
to cause Lyon to testify falsely. In closing arguments, trial counsel stated, 
Mr. Culbertson: How would Mr. Geukgeuzian feel if he had that statement and 
then he called Mr. Lyon to the stand, relying on that statement and Mr. Lyon 
then says what he said to OSI. You' ve got to rely on those things. Okay? 
You rely on them. He didn' t have the intent. It' s not established there. 
That' s an element that' s got to be there. 
(R. 00141: 160-161.) Trial counsel developed a trial strategy intended to establish that 
Geukgeuzian' s actions were not sufficiently culpable because he believed Lyon' s 
statement was true or because he didn' t know it was false, only to neglect to provide 
the jury with adequate instructions as to the required culpability. Geukgeuzian' s 
mental state was not only raised at trial but was the pivotal issue in determining his 
guilt or innocence. As such, trial counsel' s failure to instruct on requisite mental 
state or to object to the erroneous instruction fell below the " standard of reasonable 
professional assistance . . . under all attendant circumstances." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 
778, 781-82 (citations omitted). 
c. The facts of the case demonstrate that the deficient and inaccurate jury 
instructions were not harmless error and deprived Geukgeuzian of a 
fair trial. 
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The State alleges "on the facts of this case it is obvious that he [Geukgeuzian] 
acted intentionally or knowingly." Br. Appellee at 7. Moreover, the State maintains an 
"inescapable inference" is present in this case that demonstrates Geukgeuzian was aware 
that Lyon heard him threaten his wife. Br. Appellee at 16. The State attempts to 
establish this inference by emphasizing the size of the work area as well as Lyon's claims 
that he overheard Geukgeuzian threaten his wife while riding in an extended-cab pickup. 
An examination of the facts in this case dispels the basis of the State's "inescapable 
inference". 
The State identifies Lyon as "the State's key witness." Br. Appellee at 16. 
However, it is important to note that Lyon's perceptions were based upon conversations 
to which he was not a party. Lyon did not participate in the alleged conversations and 
upon direct examination Lyon concedes that he "just listened to the conversations." (R. 
00141: 24.) Thus, the State's "inescapable inference" is based upon Geukgeuzian's 
awareness of, and recollection of, Lyon potentially overhearing a conversation in which 
he threatened his wife. This problematic position becomes even more untenable when 
the number of Geukgeuzian's co-workers as well as Geukgeuzian's limited interaction 
with Lyon is considered. 
Geukgeuzian's work area is not as cozy and intimate as the State implies. 
Geukgeuzian testified that his shop had "approximately twelve to fifteen people" working 
in it. (R. 00141: 128.) Geukgeuzian additionally testified that his shop "worked closely" 
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with another shop and this created a situation in which there "was a number of 
individuals you could have worked with." (Id.) 
Furthermore, Lyon and Geukgeuzian5s contact with each other during the time in 
question was sporadic. Lyon testified that he initially heard the alleged threats during his 
first week working in the same area as Geukgeuzian. (R. 00141: 53.) After working in 
the same area as Geukgeuzian for one week, Lyon left for 30 days to complete his new 
airman training. (Id.) Lyon additionally testifies that following his new airman training 
he worked with another "team" for six weeks beginning in the middle of May. (R. 
00141: 54.) While Geukgeuzian and Lyon were co-workers, the facts demonstrate that 
their interaction was limited to only a few days which were interrupted by extended 
periods of time during which they had no contact. 
As stated above, the State's position is predicated upon Geukgeuzian remembering 
conversations with various and changing co-workers that may have occurred in Lyon's 
presence. The time frame in which Lyon claims to have heard these conversations 
includes at least one thirty-day gap. Whether Geukgeuzian would remember 
conversations that occurred a month prior, let alone who was present or could have 
possibly overheard those conversations is at least an issue on which reasonable minded 
jurors could differ. Given the number of potential co-workers and Geukgeuzian's 
sporadic interactions with Lyon it does not raise an "inescapable inference" that absent 
the errors committed by trial counsel, the result would have been the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
Geukgeuzian declines to readdress the argument concerning trial counsel' s 
failure to object contained in Appellant' s Brief. However, it is noteworthy that trial 
counsel' s failure to object to two questions solicited by the state in which the witness 
was allowed to testify as to Geukgeuzian' s state of mind compounded the prejudice 
created by the erroneous jury instructions. When viewed under the totality of the 
circumstances, by failing to object to the inaccurate and incomplete jury instructions, 
together with trial counsel' s failure to object to a line of questioning where the witness 
was invited to speculate as to Geukgeuzian' s state of mind, trial counsel' s 
performance failed to meet the standard of reasonable representation and absolutely 
prejudiced Geukgeuzian. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
conviction of the lower court and remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i s^V day of March, 2005 x£ f-
tens on 
rtis 
r Appellant 
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